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The Odùduwà Myth and the Farce of Yorùbá Unity

Introduction

The Yorùbá peoplewith a population of about twentfive million, constitute one of the largest single ethnic groups in s8aharan Africa. They are spread across four West African countries, Nigeria, Benin Republic, Togo and Sierra Leone, the largest

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whetherthrough selection or election by achievement or ascription, hasced them in a position of vantage make decisions on behalf, of give direction to, the Yorùbá Furthermore theiaspiration for a leadership position friequently justified by their self imposed desir, eor the duty placed on them by the Yoruba mastae articulate and defend their interests included herefore in the elite class have better traditional ruler, s like the Obas and Chiefs who belong to the traditional wing of the elite class, and the educated noes—the economic guruss well as the politicians who constitute the modern elite.

Obviously, the impression which the Yorùbá elite wanted to create atted for the contemporary period that the Yorùbá nation is a united and indivisible group, notwithstandingthe glaing differences betweethe various Yorùbá subproups and their perception of one another. Besides, the manner in which the elitealwanttit polarised Yorùbáland. It is therefore not surprising that achieving unity in Yorùbáland hashbec onerous.

The Odùduwà Factor and the Quest for Yorùbá Unity

A recapitulation of the Odùduwà legend is not attempted here, as it is widely documented in literature⁵ However it is to be emphasised that the Odùduwà factor became a rallying point of unty, or was used as such by the elitethe contemporary period. Meanwhile, as in the distant past when there was untochthonous group, or groups, claimidigect descent from heaven, so it is in the contemporary period. Adediran identifies ubhee communities that claimed direct descent from the skies. These is the contemporary equivalent of this development is the claim by that q is Egrosupbof the Yorùbá that

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they migrated from Wadai and had nothing to do with, Ileq š R U Od Belywald all these, and greater any other factor, one indisputable fact is the cultural homogeneity of all Yorùbá subgroups as seen in the relative similarity of their Yorùbá language and culture.

It would seem that the Odùduwà factor was not a dominant issue in the history and politics of the Yorùbá until the late 1940s when it was revived or perhaps contrived. A number of factors could account for this development. Beginning from 1821, Yorùbáland was engulfed in fratricidal wars that lasted till the end of the cểntthey last of them were the ÊNuWuSD, thought between the alliance of the till, ÎM quid i, I M quid i, I,qpi one hand, and the almighty Ibaqian the otherObviously fought to throw off the yoke of Ibadan domination, the fitting provided the needed excuse for the British incursion into the interior of Yorùbáland. Beyond the polarisation of Yorùbáland into military camps, the hostility which the war generated profoundly affected interactions among the Yorùbá states as well as their unity. Even before the outbreak of the civil wars,

Council of Elders (Y.C.B, otherwise known as

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political or ideological leaningPerhaps the need for the formation of splinter groups would not have arisen.

Beyond the failure of the elite to promote unity in Yorùbáland, it would seem that the different Yorùbá groups deeply suspect one another. Tracing the origin of these suspicions could be difficulbut it is plausible to argue that the Yorùbá civil wars of the nineteenth century as well as the colonial governishemanagement of threelationships among different groups could have accounted for it. For instame elistortions of the traditional political arrangement, the elevation of one community above another, as well as the arbitrary loation of colonial administrative bases contrary to I as

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20~JEyšQ-otJ@ErílyéšQ E\WKH FRORQLDO JRYHUQPHQW DQG VXI been acontinual source offriction between the two traditional rulers and by extension their subjects

As might be expected antagonisms among the Yorùbá have produced tiweg results of diverse kindst has generated court cases in some instances. This ewassten EHWZHhHat NOVI il ploy is strom 1924 until very recently. It has also provoked heated debates in newspapers and magazines. This was the experience of the ÑJEyPzšVšyš and Orílé, JEyšQFRPPXQLWLHV, QVore genterated Minto lapentacom floct/HVLWKI characteried by violence anothedestruction of lives and property switnessed in the , I-OpšRšGiNpšNpš DIIDLUVLQ, and from 1997 to 2000.

Ironically, the traditional elitewho should know betteare part of this rot. Thus

due to the fact that the massesving obviouslymoved awayfrom the elite manipulation in their home bases ow have free minds to relate with others ying no heed to their subgroups.

The preoccupation of the elite, both traditional and modern

One importantonsequence of disunity in Yorùbáland has been the inability of the Yorùbá to present a common front on national issues, as groups claiming to be speaking for the Yorùbá sing discordant tunes. The issue of presenting a common agenda at the National Political Reforms Conference held in 2005 is a case in point. Even when it a

be possible for them to place the attainment of Yorùbá corporatseogressland above all other considerations. Besides, there is need for the masses of the people to live above the fears and stereotypes which have charise the relationship among them in the past. More importantly, the masses should refuse any overt or covert manipuly attions believe. Until this is achieved the idea of Yorùbá unity may remain a mirage.

Notes

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