Non-Linearities, Cyber Attacks and Cryptocurrencies

Guglielmo Maria Caporale dW

cryptocurrency volumes.

Note that since $s_w^{0} r^z @_{\vec{w}1}$ has the same sign as 1, 1 A 0 implies that an increase in cyber attacks, $z_{v@1}$ >increases the probability of remaining in the low regime. Similarly, 1 A 0 implies that an increase in $z_{v@1}$ increases the probability of remaining in the high regime. ¹ The same holds for the control variables { $_{v@1}$ and } $_{v@1}$ =The density of the data has two components, one for each regime, and the log-likelihood function is constructed as a probability-weighted sum of these two components.

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data

Daily data on the closing prices and the corresponding volumes for four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethernam, Litecoin and Stellar) over the period 8/8/2015 - 28/2/2019 (for a total of 1301 observations) are employed for the analysis. The sample size was chosen on the basis of data availability. The series are taken from coinmarketcap.com. Cryptocurrencies are not o ! cially denominated in any specPc national currency; in our study they are expressed in terms of USD.

The data source for cyber attacks is https://www.hackmageddon.com, which is regularly updated with media and personal reports submitted from all over the world with daily timeliness. These include Crime, Espionage, Warfare and Hacktivism (or hacking) cyber attacks. We consider cyber attacks specically targeting cryptocurrencies (henceforth crypto attacks), The descriptive statistics (Panel A, Table 1) indicate that returns are positive for all cryptocurrencies. Higher returns are associated with higher standard deviations, as in the cases of Ethernam and Stellar, their returns being equal to 299 and 0 273, respectively. All series exhibit skewness and kurtosis. The average number of cyber attacks exceeds three per day (3.085), whereas the correspondingegure for crypto attacks is much lower (0 0 279). Over the sample as a whole, the total number of cyber and crypto attacks was equal to 4014 and 104, respectively.

As for volumes, Bitcoin and Ethereum are the argest currencies by market capitalization, with values equal to \$8 \\$89 and \$4 \\$35 millions respectively on the last day of our sample (28 February 2019); the corresponding pares for the two smaller cryptocurrencies on the same day were \$1 \$19 and \$112 millions. Volumes have been highly volatile, especially in the case of the smaller cryptomarkets.²

3.2 Empirical Results

Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the model described above are reported in Tables 2-3. The null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using the standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. We test for the presence of more than one regime against linearity using the Hansen's standardized likelihood ratio

1 403 and 1 951

in the Prst moment and for heteroskedasticity) do not provide any evidence of linear or nonlinear dependence.

4 Conclusions

This paper uses a Markov-switching non-linear speciation to analyse the e ects of cyber attacks on returns in the case of four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethernam, Litecoin and Stellar) over the period 8/8/2015-28/2/2019. More speci Ecally, it examines whether and how they a ect the probability of switching between regimes. Previous studies had shown the presence of breaks (see, e.g., Thies and Molnar, 2018 and Chiem and Laurini, 2018) and the importance of allowing for regime switches when analysing the behaviour of cryptocurrencies (see Caporale and Zekhok, 2019); it had also been suggested that suspicious trading activity might be behind jumps in the series (see Gandal et al., 2018); the present study shed lights on the possible determinants of such switches by focusing specially on the role of cyber attacks given the key importance of cyber security for assets such as cryptocurrencies. The analysis considers both cyber attacks in general and those targeting cryptocurrencies in particular, and also uses cumulative measures capturing persistence. On the whole, the results suggest the existence of significant negative e ects of cyber attacks on the probability of cryptocurrencies staying in the low volatility regime. This is an interesting Ending, which conbrms the importance of gaining a deeper undestanding of this form of crime (Benjamin et al., 2019) and of the tools used by cybercriminals (van Hardeveld et al., 2017) in order to prevent possibly severe disruptions to markets. Further research could explore intra-day data, a wider set of cryptocurrencies as well as cyber attack indicators grouped by targets.

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Panel A	Descriptive Statistics ^d								
	Cryptocurrency Returns				Cry	Cryptocurrency Volumes			
	Bitcoin	Ethe.	Lite.	Stellar	Bitcoin	Ethe.	Lite.	Stellar	
Mean	0 ≩ 01	0 2 99	0 ± 84	0	2 1680	996	265	44	
S. D.	0 €39	0₽76	0 0 57	0 €82	3 √641	1 \$331	446	94	
Skew	30 2 61								

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Hansen Test

	One day crypto attacks				Tw	Two weeks crypto attacks			
	Bitcoin	Ethe.	Lite.	Stellar	Bitcoin	Ethe.	Lite.	Stellar	
	Mean Equation								
0	0 001 (0 4 21)	30 0 02 (0 0 69)	30 0 01 (0 0 00)	30 0 06 (0 0 00)	0 ⊕01 (0 312)	30 €02 (0 €89)	30 001 (0 00)	30 0 06 (0 €00)	
0	0 €12 (0 € 00)	0 031 (0 €00)	00000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0 838 (0 900)	0 €12 (0 € 00)	0 0∉20 00	0)		

Table 2: Markov switching Estimation Results - Crypto Attacks	

	Two weeks cyber attacks							
	Bitcoin	Bitcoin Ethe. Lite.		Stellar				
	Mean Equation							
0	0 001 (0 3 87)	30 0 02 (0 €78)	30 € 01 (0 € 00)	30 0 06 (0 €00)				
0	0 €13 (0 €00)	0 θ31 (0 € 00)	0 €13 (0 € 00)	0 0 38 (0 ∌00)				
k	0 €02 (0 €00)	0 ⊕14 (0 ⊕ 36)	0 004 (0 € 00)	0 0 28 (0 ∉01)				
k	0 ⊕57 (0 ⊕ 00)	0 427 (0 €00)	0 079 (0 €00)	0 450 (0 € 00)				
! ₁	30 069 (0 00)	30 4 24 (0 € 00)	30 47 (0 € 00)	30 12 (0 €00)				
	Transition Probabilities							
	Low Regime							
0	3 974	4 955	6 531	4 855				
0	(0 ⊕12)	(0 000)	(0 000)	(0 0 00)				
1	30 ±19 (0 €08)	30 ⊕ 92 (0 ⊕ 03)	30 4 9 (0 € 03)	30 124 (0 0 38)				
2	0 4 31 (0 € 61)	30 €17 (0 €99)	30 €28 (0 €18)	30 137 (0 0 38)				
3	36 8 24 (0 ⊕00)	35 4 39 (0 €00)	34 8 51 (0 €00)	31 ≩7 1 (0 €00)				
	High Regime							
0	32 401	31 2 64	33 639	36 6 83				
0	(0 0 23)	(0 448)	(0 000)	(0 € 02)				
1	0 € 21 (0 €39)	0 974 (0 9 28)	0 0 42 (0 0 44)	0 4 43 (0 0 3)				
2	30 025 (0 4 54)	30 ⊕86 (0 ⊕16)	0 0 33 (0 5 14)	0 1 04 (0 €46)				
3	6 € 69 (0 €00)	4 5 83 (0 €00)	4 ≆01 (0 € 00)	5 θ 21 (0 θ 00)				
	Diagnostic Tests							
LB	0 2 72	0 4 51	0 =					

Table 3: Markov switching Estimation Results - Cyber Attacks

Figure 1: